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Abstract This article describes aspects of test-based accountability in the 
Netherlands. It provides a description of the design of the Educa-
tional system in the Netherlands, it gives a short introduction to the 
role of the Dutch Inspectorate of Education in the accountability of 
schools and describes different assessments that are used as sources 
of information in the accountability system. For each assessment, 
the primary function in education and its role in the accountability 
system are discussed. Finally, the factors that can potentially influ-
ence the validity of the accountability indicators and the strong and 
weak points of the current system are identified and some directions 
are presented of potential developments of this system.
Zusammenfassung In diesem Artikel werden Aspekte der testbasierten Rechenschaft-
slegung in den Niederlanden präsentiert. Zunächst werden das nied-
erländische Bildungssystem und die Rolle der Bildungsinspektion 
beschrieben. Sodann werden verschiedene Typen der Überprüfung 
vorgestellt, die die Informationsbasis für das System der Rechen-
schaftslegung bilden. Für jede Überprüfungsform werden ihre 
wesentlichen Funktionen und die Rolle, die sie im System der 
Rechenschaftslegung spielen, diskutiert. Abschließend werden Fak-
toren vorgestellt, die die Validität der Indikatoren beeinträchtigen 
können, die den Rechenschaftssystemen zugrundeliegen; es werden 
die Stärken und Schwachpunkte des gegenwärtig in den Nieder-
landen angewandten Systems präsentiert und einige Überlegungen 
zu seiner Weiterentwicklung vorgestellt.
Keywords(seperated by –) Accountability – Validity – Educational assessment – High-stakes 
testing
Schlüsselwörter Validität der Rechenschaftslegung – Bildungsevaluation – high-
stakes testing
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Abstract:  This article describes aspects of test-based accountability in the Netherlands. It pro-
vides a description of the design of the Educational system in the Netherlands, it gives a short 
introduction to the role of the Dutch Inspectorate of Education in the accountability of schools 
and describes different assessments that are used as sources of information in the accountability 
system. For each assessment, the primary function in education and its role in the accountability 
system are discussed. Finally, the factors that can potentially influence the validity of the account-
ability indicators and the strong and weak points of the current system are identified and some 
directions are presented of potential developments of this system.
Keywords:  Accountability · Validity · Educational assessment · High-stakes testing
Zusammenfassung:  In diesem Artikel werden Aspekte der testbasierten Rechenschaftslegung 
in den Niederlanden präsentiert. Zunächst werden das niederländische Bildungssystem und die 
Rolle der Bildungsinspektion beschrieben. Sodann werden verschiedene Typen der Überprüfung 
vorgestellt, die die Informationsbasis für das System der Rechenschaftslegung bilden. Für jede 
Überprüfungsform werden ihre wesentlichen Funktionen und die Rolle, die sie im System der 
Rechenschaftslegung spielen, diskutiert. Abschließend werden Faktoren vorgestellt, die die Va-
lidität der Indikatoren beeinträchtigen können, die den Rechenschaftssystemen zugrundeliegen; 
es werden die Stärken und Schwachpunkte des gegenwärtig in den Niederlanden angewandten 
Systems präsentiert und einige Überlegungen zu seiner Weiterentwicklung vorgestellt.
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Germany and many other nations are in the early stages of education reforms motivated 
in part by dissatisfaction with students’ performance on PISA and TIMSS. These reforms 
vary, but many of them have as a central element the use of achievement tests to monitor 
the performance of the educational system and to hold educators accountable.
Reforms of this sort began decades ago in the United States, and test-based account-
ability has gradually become the cornerstone of U.S. education policy. The American 
experience holds lessons for the development of reform in other nations. This paper briefly 
describes the history of performance-based reform in the U.S., notes some key findings of 
research, and describes implications for the development of reforms in other nations.
1   Introduction
In recent years the results of tests and assessments receive increasing emphasis in account-
ability systems in some Western countries. This can partly be attributed to a relative low 
performance of their students on academic assessments when compared with students 
from certain Asian nations (Anderson 2005). Another cause is the notion that high-qual-
ity education is essential for economic development and innovation (Kok 2004). As a 
result, a number of countries have introduced strong accountability measures based on 
tests and assessments to try to ensure that public schools perform at the level necessary 
for economic supremacy. A well known example is the ‘No Child Left Behind Act’ in the 
United States of America that requires every state to develop standards, standardized tests 
and accountability systems. In the Netherlands, we also see a trend in which test results 
of schools and output indicators receive increasing attention by the Dutch Inspectorate 
of Education.
In this article a number of assessments and accountability indicators in primary 
and secondary education in the Netherlands will be described. The article starts with 
a description of the design of the educational system in the Netherlands and the use of 
tests as sources of information in the accountability system. For each assessment it is 
discussed what the function of this assessment is in education and how the results are 
applied in accountability. After a short general introduction to possible threads to validity 
of accountability systems, the strong and weak points with respect to the validity in the 
Dutch accountability system are identified.
2   The Dutch education system
In the Netherlands, students start primary education at the age of four. After finishing 
primary school around age twelve, students enter into secondary education. Secondary 
education in the Netherlands is highly selective; it is a tracked system in which students 
can choose between three school types:
0  pre-vocational secondary education (VMBO): 4 year course;
0  senior general secondary education (HAVO): 5 year course;
0  pre-university education (VWO): 6 year course.
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After secondary education students go to a vocational training programme, higher profes-
sional education or university (Fig. 1).
At the different stages and different tracks of the educational system learning objec-
tives are specified. The schools are autonomous in designing their own education as long 
as they focus on the objectives. National standardized examinations at the end of second-
ary education assess whether students meet the learning objects and qualify to graduate. 
At the end of primary education, schools are required to use relevant tests to advise stu-
dents on the appropriate stream of secondary education. The examinations at the end of 
secondary education are compulsory, while placement tests and other tests are applied on 
a voluntary basis, although it is compulsory that some form of testing takes place.
3   Testing in the Netherlands
3.1  Tests in primary education
At the end of primary education schools are obliged to collect objective information about 
the most appropriate type of secondary education for the student. A vast majority of about 
85% of the schools applies a test for this purpose called the ‘Eindtoets Basisonderwijs’ 
(Van der Lubbe 2007; Resit 2009); other schools apply other tests and assessments. The 
Eindtoets Basisonderwijs contains a compulsory part of 200 multiple choice items on 
Dutch language, arithmetic and study skills and a voluntary part of 90 items on history, 
geography and science. Each year a new form of the test is constructed that contains all 
new items and of which the results are linked to the test of previous years. The Eindtoets 
Basisonderwijs and some of the other tests are based on the learning objectives that are 
specified for primary education. The primary function of the Eindtoets Basisonderwijs is 
to provide advice for the most suitable track of secondary education for a student. Aggre-
gated over students the results can also be used for diagnostic purposes on school level. 
Fig. 1: The Dutch education system
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In a similar way the Inspectorate of Education uses the results to construct an indicator 
of the effectiveness and for the accountability of the school. The average test result in the 
school is calculated and this average is corrected for social economic status and compared 
on a relative basis with the results of other similar schools. Schools that score below aver-
age for three consecutive years are identified as ‘having a high risk of being weak’. These 
schools are scheduled for inspection visits in which the quality of educational processes 
is assessed.
A different, more formative way of assessment of progress of the student is provided 
by the ‘Monitoring and Evaluation System’ of Resit (the Dutch Institute for Educational 
Measurement). This evaluation system is also applied by a large proportion of the schools. 
This system is a collection of formative tests on language, arithmetic and mathematics 
and use of information with two assessments in each grade. Results of students are evalu-
ated on a vertical equated scale for each subject. In this way students’ development can 
be monitored and based on the results and the diagnostic information it contains, the 
educational process can be adapted to suit these students’ needs.
3.2  Examinations and certification in secondary education
At the end of secondary education students are to take a set of final examinations in a 
number of subjects within a profile that the student has chosen. The final examination is 
divided into two parts: a school examination and a national examination. Dutch language 
is a compulsory subject in the national examination in all types of secondary education. 
English language and some form of mathematics are compulsory elements in the national 
examination in pre-university and senior-general secondary education. Other compulsory 
subjects depend on the profiles (pre-university and senior-general secondary education) 
or type of vocational training the student has chosen. The elements to be tested in each 
examination are specified in the examination syllabus, approved by the Ministry of Edu-
cation, Culture and Science. The syllabus also specifies the number and length of the tests 
that make up the national examination. After passing these examinations, students gain 
access to different forms of further education.
Schools are responsible for setting up the school examination. Every year schools 
are required to submit their own school examination syllabus to the Inspectorate show-
ing which elements of the syllabus will be tested, when, and how marks are calculated, 
including the weight allocated to these tests and resit opportunities.
Generally speaking, a school examination consists of two or more tests per subject. 
These may be oral, practical or written. The school examinations are produced by the 
schools themselves or by test institutes. The school examinations are marked by the 
pupils’ own teacher. There are also practical assignments for which no marks are given, 
only an acknowledgement that the examinee has completed them properly. The school 
examination must be completed and the results submitted to the Inspectorate before the 
national examinations start.
The national examination consists of tests with open or multiple-choice questions and, 
in some cases, a practical component. For some subjects, there is only a school examina-
tion. The national examination can be sat at three sessions during the school year—in 
May, June and August. All examinees sit the examination in May. The June and August 
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sessions are for pupils doing resits, or who were unable to sit the examination in May. The 
national examinations, which are the responsibility of the Dutch Ministry of Education, 
are produced by RESIT. The examinations are marked by the pupils´ own teacher and 
checked by a teacher from another school.
The head teacher is responsible for determining the examinees’ final marks. The final 
mark in each subject is the average of the mark for the school examination and the mark 
for the national examination. To obtain a leaving certificate, an examinee must have 
scored passing marks in a specified number of subjects. For subjects with only a school 
examination, the mark obtained is the final mark (rounded off).
Marks are awarded on a scale ranging from 1 (very poor) to 10 (excellent). A six is a 
pass. It is clear that examinees with a final mark of six or higher for every subject have 
passed their school-leaving examination. However, even if they get a lower mark in some 
subjects, they can still be awarded an overall passing mark. Successful examinees receive 
a certificate and a transcript listing the marks scored in the school examination, the marks 
scored in the national examination, the final marks for each subject and the outcome of 
the school-leaving examination. Examinees who fail the examination after doing resits 
may decide to repeat the final year, go to an institute for adult secondary general educa-
tion, or prepare for the state examination.
Next to the examinations a growing number of schools, currently approximately 40 
percent apply a version of the CITO ‘Monitoring and Evaluation System’ that is suitable 
for secondary education. There are tests in Dutch and English Language, mathematics 
and use of information and there are four test administrations divided over the first three 
years of secondary education. Schools are not obliged to use this system and can choose 
to participate with only a subset subjects and a reduced number of administrations. Again 
students are evaluated on a vertical equated scale for each subject. In this way students 
development can be monitored and the educational process can be adapted to students 
needs.
3.3  Entrance test in teacher training programs
Recently compulsory computer adaptive test were introduced to evaluate the proficiency 
level in arithmetic and spelling of students who wanted to enrol in a teacher training pro-
gram. Although arithmetic and spelling are basis skills that are mostly taught in primary 
education, the impression existed that quite some students lost part of their proficiency 
during secondary education. For example the use of a calculator in secondary education 
prevents students to practice doing calculations by heart. The tests are presented in an 
adaptive form (see e.g. Van der Linden and Glas 2000). This means that harder items 
are selected if the student performed well on the previous items and that easier items are 
selected if the students made errors in the previous items. This procedure has the advan-
tage that the proficiency of the student can be estimated efficiently and that the student 
gets items at the right level (challenging but not too hard). Students have to pass this 
test before the end of the first year otherwise they would be expelled from the training 
program. The standard of the tests were set at the proficiency level of a student at the 80th 
percentile rank at the end of primary education. Especially at the first administrations a 
very large proportion of the students failed this test. This was one of the causes to decide 
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to put more emphasis on maintaining basic skills in mathematics and Dutch language in 
secondary education.
3.4  National assessments of the educational system
Next to the test focussing on the evaluation of performance of the individual student, 
there are some studies to evaluate the educational system. The study Cool5-18 (Driessen 
et al. 2009; Zijsling et al. 2009) collects longitudinal data of students in the age range 
between 5 and 18 years old. With three year cycles, background variables, educational 
position and both cognitive (mathematics, Dutch language, English language and citizen-
ship) and non-cognitive skills (Big Five personality traits) are collected. Performance on 
the cognitive skills, mathematics and Dutch (and English) language is based on the results 
from the Cito ‘Monitoring and Evaluation System’ for students in primary education 
(Rosier 2001; Sluijter and Rosier 2002). The tests that are used in the study in second-
ary education and vocational training are adapted versions of tests from the ‘Monitoring 
and Evaluation System’ for secondary education. In pre-university and senior general 
education the final measurement of the mathematics and language skills is based on the 
examinations in secondary education.
Next to this longitudinal study there is a national assessment called Periodieke Peiling 
van het OnderwijsNiveau (PPON, eng= periodic assessment of educational level) in pri-
mary education that evaluates different subjects in detail but with irregular intervals (Van 
der Schoot 2008). Tailor made tests are used that evaluate relevant aspects of the subject. 
The test are assigned in an incomplete design, and for all the different aspects standards 
are set based on expert content judgements. For this judgments a bookmark procedure is 
applied. To provide an idea about the level of detail, the last assessment of mathematics 
was evaluated on 22 different aspects.  Information from this study is used by content 
experts and decision makers to monitor the educational system and to evaluate if changes 
to the current curriculum are necessary.
4   Use of tests in accountability
In general, achievement tests can be important sources of information for evaluating 
school performance. In many accountability systems all over the world, schools or educa-
tors receive rewards, sanctions or both on the basis of students’ test scores. Other output 
parameters may be the magnitude of student absenteeism, student drop-out rates etc. In 
most accountability systems worldwide, test scores are used to hold schools to account, 
but they can also be used to hold individual students, teachers or even districts or local 
communities to account (Ehren, submitted). Students may for example be confronted 
with sanctions such as having to repeat a class or having to follow compulsory summer 
classes when they fail to achieve nationally defined targets on test scores. Teachers may 
receive bonuses when meeting certain output targets, or be replaced or withheld from 
permanent contracts when failing to meet the targets. Districts or local communities may 
receive fines or bonuses or may loose government over their schools as a result of state 
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take-over when too many schools within the district function below some performance 
target.
In the Netherlands test scores are also an important part of educational accountabil-
ity. The Inspectorate is legally complied to assess educational quality in schools (also 
including educational processes in the school such as a safe learning environment), but 
tests are expected to predict the quality of these educational processes in the school. The 
Inspectorate of Education uses test scores (next to annual reports and complaints and 
other signals on the functioning of schools) as part of an early warning system to detect 
schools with low educational quality. Schools that have declining or low test scores dur-
ing a period of three years are considered to be failing or at risk of failing.
In primary education two different indicators of performance are used if there are 
test results available. The first indicator is based on the average test score in a school. 
This average is compared to the general mean score of a group of comparable schools. 
For this a total of 7 groups are defined based on the characteristics of student population 
and taking into account the level of education of the parents and the ethnic background 
of the students. The deviation of the average score to the relevant group mean is used to 
identify both over- and underperformance in a particular year. To evaluate performance 
of the school the inspectorate uses intervals of three years of test scores to increase the 
reliability of the results.
The use of tests by the Inspectorate of Education may have a number of difficulties. 
The first problem occurs when using test scores of schools with a limited number of stu-
dents. In these schools the average score can be unstable over the years due to fluctuations 
in the performance level of the student population. Another complicating factor in this 
type of indicator is that a relative comparison is used. For smaller schools this leads to a 
higher probability of false positive and false negative evaluations (Verhelst et al. 2001). 
The second indicator corrects for this last problem and is based on a hierarchical regres-
sion model (Goldstein 2003) with a correction for the social economic composition of the 
student population in the school. The estimated school effects are used as indicator for 
over- and underperforming schools. Again reliability can be increased by evaluating over 
multiple years.
In secondary education an output indicator of a school is based on the average results 
on the national examination. The average is calculated over all students and all subjects. 
Next to the average result the difference between the national and the school based exam-
inations is evaluated as a check on the standard used in the school based examinations. 
This last indicator was introduced after research showed that in some schools the average 
mark on the school based examinations were substantially higher than on the national 
examinations (De Lange and Dronkers 2007).
In both primary and secondary schools that are identified as failing, school inspectors 
will meet with the governmental boards of the schools to talk about causes of failure in 
schools; only when these meetings do not clarify the causes of failure in schools will 
they visit these schools to investigate the cause of risks. Schools that show sufficient test 
scores will not be visited, apart from a minor check up once every four years. This type of 
‘risk-based school inspections’ was implemented in 2007/2008 to decrease the adminis-
trative load on schools and to enable a more efficient use of inspection capacity.
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Compared to accountability systems in other countries and states the schools in the 
Netherlands are confronted with relatively low stakes in having to account for potentially 
low test scores. The Inspectorate only identifies these schools for increased monitoring 
and schools are obliged to write an improvement plan. There are no financial or legal 
sanctions, and schools do not have to meet specific targets related to test scores.
Compared to other accountability systems the Dutch system has a primary focus on 
the schools. Indicators describe output of schools and average performance targets for 
the entire pupil population in a school. Internationally also students, teachers, districts 
and local authorities are identified as potential stakeholders. For example in some coun-
tries the students have to meet (nationally defined) targets including minimum test scores 
with respect to math, reading and writing. In these countries sanctions and rewards may 
occur. Students for example may by central legislation be confronted with sanctions such 
as having to repeat a class or having to follow compulsory summer classes. Rewards 
may include scholarships for further education. Internationally also examples occur were 
teachers are assessed individually by school inspectors to determine whether they per-
form according to the indicators and performance targets in the accountability systems. In 
some countries, test scores of groups of students are used to assess performance of teach-
ers. In the U.S., some states hold their districts accountable for the average performance 
of the schools within that district. Districts may receive fines or bonuses or may loose 
government over their schools as a result of state take-over when too many schools within 
the district function below some performance target. Accountability in the Netherlands 
does not have a direct focus on these other potential stakeholders. Students, teachers or 
local communities are not part of the educational accountability system, although the test 
results of a student will often have a direct impact on the education or educational career. 
It is also possible that the school government holds teachers to account for the results of 
the indicators produced by the inspectorate. By the same token, local politicians could 
focus on the results of schools in their jurisdiction for their political aims. In this way 
local initiatives could lead to local accountability systems that are derived from the school 
based accountability introduced by the Inspectorate. Figure 2 summarizes the Dutch edu-
cational accountability system.
To evaluate the validity of the Dutch accountability system, the aspects of accountabil-
ity systems that are considered to be relevant for validity of the system are first identified. 
For this purpose, an overview of the literature on validity of accountability systems is 
presented. After this overview, the Dutch system is evaluated based on the relevant valid-
ity aspects.
4.1  Validity issues of accountability indicators
In general, validity addresses the concern of whether we are measuring what we intend 
to measure (Hill 2001). In the case of accountability systems, validity involves the infer-
ences people are drawing from the results and whether these are consistent with actual 
results. When test scores are used to measure output of schools, validity refers to the 
degree to which evidence and theory support the interpretations of test scores for this 
purpose (Kane 2002; Sireci and Parker 2006). The test itself is not validated, and test 
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scores per se are not validated. It is the interpretation determined by the proposed use that 
is validated.
Several authors argue a more comprehensive view on validity when evaluating 
accountability systems. Marion and Gong (2003) for example state that the evaluation 
of accountability system validity must also specify how and why the system is intended 
to work in order to improve student learning and system capacity. Validation should 
include an evaluation of the consequences of uses and interpretations of the assessments, 
including both negative and positive consequences as well as the intended and probable 
unintended consequences (Lane et al. 1998). If, for example, tests are to help improve 
system performance, there should be information provided to document that test results 
are modifiable by quality instruction and student effort (Baker et al. 2002). Accountability 
systems are considered to be invalid when stakeholders in the system have no opportunity 
to control (some of) the components of the evaluation and when the consequences for 
stakeholders are not coordinated to support system goals or when stakes do not apply to 
adults and students symmetrically (Baker et al. 2002). In general incentives and sanctions 
that push in opposite directions for the professionals in education and for students can be 
counterproductive. They need to be consistent with each other and with the goals of the 
system. Probably, a situation with high to medium-high stakes for the individual student 
and not more than medium-high stakes for the aggregated indicator works best. In such 
a situation the test results service their primary purpose and provide valuable informa-
tion at the individual level to both students and teachers, while the aggregated results can 
serve as unobtrusive indicators of outcome of education. But if the stakes on the aggre-
gated indicator becomes too high due to pressure on the actors that are evaluated (e.g. 
the schools) this can ultimately lead to strategic behaviour on the test and consequently 
to invalidation of the indicator. Figlio and Getzler (2002) and Cullen and Reback (2006) 
Fig. 2: Summary of Dutch educational accountability system
Students Schools Districts/local
communities
Standards Output
Educational processes 
Measurement
methods
Tests
Inspection visits
Results of internal evaluations
Desk research
Targets Targets on educational processes
Targets on output (e.g. cut-score)
Stakes Rewards
Sanctions
Interventions
Stakeholders
Teachers
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for example describe how schools at risk of failing improve their state-assigned grade or 
classification by taking their poorest performing students out of the testing pool. This type 
of intended strategic behavior is usually referred to as ‘reshaping the test pool’. Schools 
may do so by classifying (regular) students into the ‘special education’ or ‘limited Eng-
lish proficient’ categories that may be exempted from taking the test (Jacob 2005) or they 
may retain low-scoring students in grades below those in which the test is administered, 
allow an increase in absences on test days, or grant exemptions from testing by parents 
and increasing dropout rates. According to a study by Jacob and Levitt (2003) in 4–5% of 
the classrooms cheating occurs. Teachers may do so by prompting students with the right 
answer during a test, providing the actual test items in advance, providing hints during 
test administration, making changes to answer sheets before scoring or leaving pertinent 
materials in view during the testing session.
4.2  Evaluating the validity of the use of tests in the Dutch accountability system
The above aspects are also relevant for the evaluation of the validity of the Dutch account-
ability system. The first question is: Does the system actually give an indication of educa-
tional quality, or of the potential risk of a lack of quality? Based on their primary function 
as summative or formative assessment, it can be assumed that the tests and assessments 
will validly measure the proficiency of the individual student. This will not necessarily be 
the case for the aggregated results that are used as indicator for the quality of education 
at the school level. Two aspects are important. Firstly, the indicator can be a misrepresen-
tation of educational quality if parts of the curriculum are not represented in the tests at 
hand. For example the tests at the end of primary education do not contain active writing 
skills. Although one can argue that not all relevant aspects are represented, a relatively 
low score on the tests could still validly be interpreted as a potential lack of quality. Sec-
ondly, one can argue that valid measurement of the individual ask for different character-
istics and content of the tests than measurement of schools. Potentially some items in the 
tests are not valid for the assessment of quality of the school. For example, this will be 
the case if items to some extent measure aptitude instead of attainment. In that case the 
performance on these items is not so much influenced by the school, but more by external 
factors like intelligence or SES (Popham 1999). In the Netherlands this is at least to some 
extent the case in the Eindtoets Basisonderwijs, the test at the end of primary education. 
This test aims at predicting success in secondary education. It is known that the domain of 
reading comprehension in this test is less influenced by the school than most of the other 
content domains. Based on this one could argue that an indicator of school quality could 
be constructed in which the reading comprehension items are removed.
Another issue in the validity of the Dutch accountability system is the use of relative 
standards with respect to outcome indicators used to assess schools. For example, the 
average results in a school are compared with results from different schools that have 
a similar population. In this manner a dependency in the evaluation exists between the 
results of an individual school and all of the other schools in this comparison. The relative 
nature of this comparison can lead to a thread of validity if the idea takes post that this 
comparison is unfair. This could be the case if differences in the situation of the school 
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(e.g. a more difficult student population) do not occur in the other schools with which the 
comparison is made.
Finally, the condition in which the tests are administered is a crucial factor to the 
validity of the accountability indicators. As described above the school based indicators 
in the Netherlands are based on tests and assessments that serve multiple purposes. In 
such occasions the validity of the system of indicators at a school or system level are 
both influenced by the stakes of the test results and by the stakes of the indicators based 
on these test results. The test results do often have an effect on the educational career of 
the students and as such, especially the summative assessments like the examinations in 
secondary education, are high stakes to the students. Looking at the indicators based on 
the test results, the stakes in the Dutch accountability systems mainly affect the schools, 
while other actors, such as teachers are not held directly accountable for the performance 
of the school and the average test scores obtained by the school. There may be concerns 
about the degree to which they will contribute to making sure that students achieve high 
test scores. In practise this will often be no serious issue, since the primary function of the 
test should provide an incentive for the student to perform well. From this perspective the 
total system seems to be relatively balanced.
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AQ1.  Please provide a German version of the article title.
AQ2.  Figure 1 was not cited in the text. Please check if the citation has been inserted at 
the correct place.
AQ3.  “Resit 2009” is cited in the text but is not given in the reference list. Please provi-
de a full reference or delete the citation.
AQ4.  “Cito (2009)” is not cited in the text. Please provide the citation or delete the 
entry from the reference list.
AQ5.  Please update the reference “Ehren (Submitted)”.
